State owned enterprises are generally regarded as inefficient firms because of political objectives, external interference, and corruption. Notwithstanding this, studies have shown that Singapore state owned enterprises exhibit higher valuations than those of non-GLCs after controlling for firm specific factors and also have better corporate governance practices. In this paper, the authors posit an explanation. This explanation draws on the political, social and economic context that Singapore found herself in during the period of self-governance to the early years of independence from the late 1950s to the early 70s. The paper offers the view that the difficult economic conditions coupled with a contested democratic political environment in Singapore during this period played a significant role in fostering good political governance in Singapore which was in turn transposed to her state owned enterprises.
e-Owne

INTRODUCTION
It is easy to forget that a few decades ago state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were generally viewed as inefficient quasi-government departments which posed no meaningful competitive threat to privately-owned corporations. In fact, as recently as a decade ago, many pundits posited that SOEs were on the verge of extinction.
1 Around that time, two
American academic luminaries boldly declared the "End of History for Corporate Law"
claiming that the market-oriented model of the shareholder-centric corporation had triumphed over its principal competitors (SOEs included).
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Over the last decade, however, the renaissance of SOEs has made comparative corporate law seem more like the beginning of time rather than the end of history. In this new era, SOEs have made a valiant return from the precipice of extinction and now compose a substantial portion of the world's most powerful corporations. Indeed, SOEs have come to dominate several key global industries and are the backbone of the Chinese economy (which is on course to become the world's largest economy).
3
The meteoric rise of SOEs, combined with the spectacular economic growth of China, has made the future of SOEs in China an issue of global importance. The success and sustainability of China's SOEs has been vigorously debated both within China and internationally. In the midst of this debate, however, a somewhat surprising view appears to be emerging: that Singapore's SOEs (also referred to in Singapore as government-linked companies or GLCs) may provide a good model for reforming China's SOE Model. 4 In fact, very recently, the Chinese government decided that by 2020 the Singapore GLC Model would be replicated in China 30 times over-making this proposed reform potentially one of the most important corporate governance initiatives of our time.
5
On the brink of such a watershed reform, it is tempting to jump quickly to make predictions about the impact that transplantingthe Singapore GLC Model will have on Chinese corporate governance. This article, however, avoids this temptation. Rather, it focuses on a more basic, yet fundamentally important, question that seems to have been largely overlooked in the rush to reform: What is the historical foundationand important drivers of the Singapore GLC Model? By answering this question, this article hopes to clarify exactly what Chinais aiming to transplant or, indeed, whether what China (or others) aims to transplant is even transplantable at all. Ultimately, this article concludes that the Singapore GLC Model is so closely intertwined with Singapore's idiosyncratic history and unique regulatory culture that, although the model has been extremely successful within Singapore, transplanting it to China (and we suspect, most likely, anywhere else) could be difficult.
In the process of arriving at this conclusion, this article further illuminates two broader points that cut to the core of comparative corporate law theory. First, as alluded to above, the success of the Singapore GLC Model and China's ambition toemulateit challenge notions that corporate governance systems are converging towards a market-oriented (American) model of the shareholder-centric corporation. 6 Indeed, an examination of the historical evolution of the Singapore GLC Model illustrates that a highly successful economy and system of corporate governance can be built on a foundation of corporations that have the government (and not only private free-market actors) as their ultimate controlling shareholder. Importantly, this feature of Singapore corporate governance has been maintained even as Singapore has moved from a developing, to a developed, and now to a world-leading economy that generates a GDP per person that exceeds all of the G7 countries 7 and has produced the world's highest percentage of millionaires. Perhaps even more attractive to Chinese Communist Party officials, however, is the evidence that on a micro-economic level the Singapore GLC Modelappears to produce strong corporate performance and promotes good corporate governance-something which has tended to elude Chinese SOEs. To the extent that investors will demand a discount to the share price for companies that are perceived to be inefficient or have suboptimal governance structures, studies have shown that far from Singapore GLCs trading at a discount to their peers, capital markets in fact value GLCs more highly than non-GLCs. One study estimated this premium at 20% after taking into account other variables that might affect firm value such as industry effects, size and monopoly power, profitability (it being the case that GLCs are generally more profitable), and bankruptcy risk.
20
Another study corroborated this by finding that GLCs on average exhibit higher valuations than those of non-GLCs after controlling for firm specific factors. This study concluded that on average GLCs provided superior returns on both assets and equity and are valued more highly than non-GLCs. GLCs also did better in many performance measures and did not appear to be worse off in other measures. As such, they were more highly valued. 21 Interestingly, this study also found that GLCs in general managed their expenses better than non-GLC companies. The lower expense-to-sales ratio among GLCs indicated For their part, the left-wing Chinese extremists saw Lee Kuan Yew and his group as a convenient front to gain political power because they were more likely to be acceptable to the British. Thus, in its early days, the PAP was divided into two wings, the non-communists there could obtain 'pioneer status' and tariff protection. 28 This was a potentially serious development for Singapore which regarded Malaya as an important economic hinterland.
There was also an urgent need to provide employment. While open unemployment at around 5% in 1957 was not exceptionally high, this did not take into account large
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numbers of people who could not be regarded as fully employed. 19% of Singapore households and 25% of individuals were found to be in poverty, which was defined as a household income that was insufficient for minimum standards. 29 The rapid rise in the birth rate also foreshadowed future difficulties. Between 1947 and 1957 Singapore's population grew at 4.4% annually with natural increase accounting for most of this growth. 30 This would eventually translate into significant labour force growth and government policy had to take this into account. Singapore's reliance on entrepot commerce and the income from British military bases would be insufficient to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population which would require an increase in social services. 31 In a 1955 report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Singapore's ability to meet public financial requirements from domestic resources was doubted unless additional taxes were levied and present balances drawn upon. 32 This was because net public expenditure for social services was expected to increase significantly, albeit from a low level.
33
Goh Keng Swee, who was later to become Singapore's Deputy Prime Minister, described the political situation faced by the PAP government in the following way: By 1960, the social democrats in the PAP reluctantly came to the decision that they had to break with the communists, and possibly bring the fight into the open. Their chances of success were extremely small, and it was likely that the communists would then take over the reins of government, either directly or, more likely,
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through proxies willing to prostitute themselves for a brief illusion of political glory."
35
Although it is sometimes remarked that the difficulties of the 1950s and 1960s may be overstated to enhance the role played by the PAP government as led by Lee Kuan Yew, it cannot be doubted that the political climate at that time was fluid and uncertain.
To increase its popular support, the PAP government embarked on a programme of social reform. 36 One priority was to construct more public housing. : 1965-2000 (2000) , he wrote at 19 that he never expected to find himself in charge of an independent Singapore which faced "tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival. Singapore was not a natural country but man-made, a trading post the British had developed into a nodal point in their world-wide maritime empire. We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a body." See also TURNBULL,supra note 25, at 274 -275. (1976) . After winning the 1968 general election, two of the policy directions laid down by the PAP government were the stimulation of economic growth through the cultivation of new activities and by taking advantage of new economic opportunities, and increased functional specialization in the institutions concerned with economic development. These policy directives led to the establishment of a number of public enterprises and also brought direct government participation into new spheres such as manufacturing, transport, trading and banking. The government no longer confined itself to an indirect economic role. It assumed entrepreneurial responsibilities and moved into areas which had traditionally been in the hands of the private sector. According to Ow Chin Hock, id., at 158, this can be contrasted with the government's approach in its State Development Plan, 1961 Plan, -1964 , which focused on the pattern and financing of government development expenditure, which would support and complement the industrialisationprogramme. From this plan it could be seen that although the government envisaged a larger role for itself in economic development, it confined itself to the indirect role of providing economic infrastructure and incentives to attract foreign investment and promote industrial growth. There have been suggestions that the PAP government used the opportunity presented by Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia to engender a constant sense of crisis so as to build support for the PAP and encourage Singaporeans to make sacrifices for the future, see e.g. HOPF, supra note 61, at 324 -326; PEEBLES & WILSON, supra note 42 at 7. While it is true that the PAP government does try to justify many policies on the basis of Singapore's inherent vulnerability as a small state, and was undoubtedly astute enough to make use of Singapore's expulsion to solidify its support, it is suggested that its fear of going it alone was genuine. Historically, geographically and culturally Singapore was bound to the Malayan peninsula and the idea of an independent Singapore separate from Malaya would not have been the preferred option at that time and unthinkable to a large part of the population.
The Singapore government was not unaware of the risks of such an approach. Lee Kuan Yew has written of his fear that the GLCs would become subsidised and loss making nationalised corporations as had happened in many new countries. However, he was persuaded by Hon Sui Sen, who was then a Permanent Secretary and later became Minister for Finance, that it was possible to succeed as these companies could compete in the market. If they were not profitable they would be shut down. Lee Kuan Yew, together with other cabinet colleagues such as Goh Keng Swee, thought this bold plan was worth the risk given the dearth of entrepreneurs. Huff,supra note 24, at 739.
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for this was the PAP's governance record. The party's good economic management and social policies had helped it to garner more support from the populace. As the PAP leadership under Lee Kuan Yew was aware of its initially precarious position within Singapore's political arena, and sought to win the support of the majority of Singaporeans, their strategy was to improve the social and economic conditions of the people.Good economic management was regarded as an important key to strengthening the PAP's political position, and government entrepreneurship was intended to facilitate Singapore's economic development. 72 GLCs gave the government considerable influence in certain segments of the economy.
The link between economic legitimacy and political power in Singapore cannot be understated. Singapore has for most of her modern history been a largely immigrant society focussed on commercial enterprise.The Chinese, Indians and other races that came to
Singapore did so to engage in trade or to find work. By the end of the nineteenth century
Singapore had a secure place in the pattern of world trade as a staple port, the entrepot for Southeast Asian raw materials and Western manufactured goods, with an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure of commercial institutions and expertise. 73 Singapore today is still essentially a commercial city and her survival is premised on her ability to be commercially relevant to the wider region around her and as an important node for Western commercial enterprises and investors. Thus while economic growth is important to all countries, it has an almost existential condition in Singapore. It is therefore not surprising that economic legitimacy is probably the most important determinant of political legitimacy in Singapore.
The social contract with the people that has kept the PAP government in power since independence is widely accepted to be the promise of employment and a fair distribution of economic benefits, a significant part of which is represented by the provision of good public housing which a large majority of Singaporeans reside in. 74 It has been suggested that any 72 Goh(1995),supra note 34, at 103 refers to the government having to involve itself in direct ownership and control of many industrial, financial and commercial enterprises to bring about economic growth.
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The perception that this social contract is less effective today was a major contributing factor to the results of the 2011 General Election in Singapore which saw the opposition winning an unprecedented 6 out of the 87 elected seats in Parliament and the loss of 2 cabinet ministers. Subsequently, the serious diminution of the positions of GLCs would have major implications for the political regime, one reason being that the fortunes of the GLCs will influence the reformulation of any new social contract between the government and Singapore's citizens. 75 Thus fortuitously from the outset the conditions to encourage the responsible management of GLCs were in place. The management of GLCs in the Singapore context cannot be separated from the overall approach that the PAP government adopted in the development of the Singapore economy.After all it was civil servants acting at the behest of their political masterswho were tasked in the earlier years with managing GLCs which they did with the goal of economic development in mind.
In keeping with the goal of fostering good governance, the government also adopted a zero tolerance approach to corruption. It is well known that corruption was fairly widespread in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s and the PAP set out to contrast its conduct with that of the previous Labour Front government. Much of the corruption in Singapore at the time was of the petty kind but there were also larger scandals. The PAP government set out to eradicate corruption and today Singapore is regarded as one of the least corrupt countries. This undoubtedly was also a factor in GLCs in Singapore being relatively well managed and not the victims of rent seeking that often occur in SOEs elsewhere. Indeed the aversion of the PAP government to corruption, particularly in the public sector, is evidenced by the fact that under Singapore law, a public servant who receives any gratification shall be presumed to have received such gratification corruptly as an inducement or reward unless the contrary is proved by such public servant.
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With GLCs seen as an important engine in the development of the Singapore economy, the main method chosen by the government to exercise control over GLCs when civil servants ceased to manage such companies was the appointment of top civil servants to the boards of these companies. These civil servants serve a monitoring function but 
Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 241), ¶ 8. The general position without the presumption is that the prosecution has to prove both the gratification and that such gratification was solicited or given "as an inducement to or reward for" doing or forbearing to do something, Prevention of Corruption Act, ¶ 5. , 202-04 (1983) . Pillai points out that government directors are clustered along related industries to allow specialization and prevent over-extension that would lead to such directors being unable to expand adequate time and energy on the activities of their companies. Specialization means that these directors would be familiar with the industry, trends and developments and could more readily contribute and safeguard the state's investment than if they were directors of companies in widely disparate groups. At first blush, Singapore's traditionally narrow definition of independence appears to call into question the authenticity of hercommitment to truly independent boards. Indeed, conventional comparative corporate governance theory suggests that the primary role of independent directors in a controlling shareholder environment should beto monitor controlling shareholders with the ultimate goal of protecting minority shareholdersby policing private benefits of control-a task that is unlikely to be performed adequately by directors connected with the controlling shareholder. Interestingly, however,it appears that conventional corporate governance theorymay not apply to Temasek in this caseas the foundational assumption that controlling shareholdersare strongly incentivized to extract private benefits of control does not fit intoTemasek's incentive structure. To the contrary, based on our analysis above, it appears that Temasek is highly incentivized to use its controlling power to ensure that GLCs are run efficiently as this serves its (and, ultimately, 82 For example, CARL A. TROCKI, SINGAPORE: WEALTH, POWER AND THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 174 (2006) offers the view that the GLCs and statutory boards are important political tools as they provide the government with a ready means of rewarding its bureaucratic allies with jobs as directors or managers of these enterprises. They also act as a recruiting ground for talent.CfPILLAI, supra note 77, at 206, who asserts that there is an absence of the political spoils system by which the ruling party appoints directors to state enterprises on the basis of political expediency and as rewards for political service, rather than ability or potential contribution to the enterprise. Second, despite the dominant ownership and control of the government, GLCs are professionally-managed with limited interference from the government. Temasek's policy is to ensure that independent boards on portfolio companies provide the requisite strategic direction and monitoring so as to benefit shareholders, including the minority shareholders.
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For a more detailed discussion of how classic corporate governance theory and the concept of private benefits of control fails to capture the complex reality of controlling shareholders in Asia see, Puchniak, supranote 16. The hands-off approach that is historically evident in GLCs stands in stark contrast to some countries where the government (or in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) holds a tight leash over its SOEs and their management and governance. For instance, in Chinese SOEs, decision-making on important matters vests in the hands of the CCP, which it exercises through various mechanisms including by deciding on the appointment and promotion of top SOE executives. 85 While it is true that political legitimacy constitutes the bulwark of strong economic development both in Singapore and China, the manner in which such legitimacy is asserted in the context of SOEs varies significantly in the two countries.
While it is indirect and subtle in the Singapore context, it is rather pronounced in China.
Third, the broad themes of public governance in Singapore have also been transposed to its GLCs. Professionalism in management and governance, executive compensation practices that ensure attraction of the best talent and a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption are hallmarks of governance both in Singapore's public sector as well as its GLCs. Not many countries have achieved the level of talent, effectiveness and efficiency in their public governance to make it a potential asset in the highly competitive global market for corporate governance, which seems to be apparent in the interface between the Singapore government and her GLCs. 
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This is by no means an assertion that democracy is a necessary prerequisite for economic growth. Rather, the fact that Singapore adopted a democratic form of government and the PAP faced a contested political environment were factors that we argue contributed significantly to good governance in Singapore.
allies in the PAP had the communist wing of the Party to contend with which eventually broke away to form the BarisanSosialis.
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Fifth, the fact that the PAP's legitimacy is deeply intertwined with Singapore's economic performance creates a structure in which Temasek has clear incentives to ensure that GLCs are effectively governed for the benefit of all shareholders. This suggests that conventional comparative corporate governance theory, which assumes that controlling shareholders are incentivized primarily to extract private benefits of control, does not seem to apply in full force to Temasek. As such, to understand Temasek and how it exerts controlling power overthe governance of GLCs,requires a uniquely Singaporean lens toilluminate the historical foundations of the principles of economic pragmatism and political stability that have moulded its effective governance.
In this article, we began with a discussion of the "convergence" thesis in corporate governance and how the emergence and operation of SOEs detract from that thesis. 88 As we have further sought to establish, the historical evolution of Singapore GLCs and the unique factors of governance they display appear to throw cold water on the convergence argument. On the contrary, there are clear indications of divergence. In that context, our study of the historical evolution of GLCs in Singapore reflects greater sanguinity about the divergence approach towards corporate governance that is supported by the "path dependency" thesis.This suggests that corporate structures and institutions are likely to be shaped very closely by existing structures, which are not amenable to material change due to rent seeking and interest group politics. 89 Moreover, as our study underscores, political
The absence of universal suffrage in China is another significant difference from Singapore. However, the historical political cycle in China could act as a proxy. It is a familiar aspect of Chinese history that her dynasties have followed the familiar path of giving way to revolution when the ruler is perceived to have lost the Mandate of Heaven by failing to rule well. There can be no doubt that the leaders of the CCP are aware that if the CCP wishes to remain in power, good governance will have to be strengthened and corruption reduced.
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and cultural 91 factors play an important role in shaping corporate governance structures and practices. Having said this, it is entirely possible that over time,Singapore's dominant form of corporate governance could evolve sufficiently to resemble the market-oriented model of the shareholder-centric corporation. Even so, it is perhaps a fallacy to assume that there is a 'resting point' for corporate governance structures. A 'converged' system of corporate governance may itself evolve over time into something materially different.
While the optimism among Chinese officials to achieve a transplant of Singapore's successful GLC model into China is comprehensible, as might be the case with other countries exploring this model as a potential one for reform, we caution against its wholesale adoption without regard to the underlying historical factors in Singapore that have been at play. The goal of this article has been to highlight these historical factors with a view to providing some further strands of thought into the convergence-versus-divergence debate.
At the same time, we consider this study to be the initial building block for further academic research on Singapore GLCs. Possible further avenues for research include: (i) the precise nature of management and governance structures and mechanisms in GLCs, and how they operate in fact; (ii) comparison between the governance structures and mechanisms between GLCs and privately-owned companies in Singapore; and (iii) comparison between the governance and performance of GLCs and SOEs in other jurisdictions. These will enable a further understanding of the role and impact of SOEs, which continue to be a dominant force in several Asian markets, with their influence extending to other parts of the world. More broadly, it is our hope that these approaches will expand and challenge conventional notions and theories in corporate governance, so as to widen the discourse. 
